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BREAKING UP WITH DILLON: A PRACTICAL CALL FOR
VIRGINIA STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW REFORM
KARLY NEWCOMB*
INTRODUCTION
States’ long-standing allegiance to the Dillon Rule stems from the
theory that it prevents localities from passing unequal and corrupt laws.1
However, states with strict adherence to the Dillon Rule have stifled locali-
ties from addressing their own issues and priorities.2 Though the debates
surrounding the Dillon Rule’s strengths and weaknesses have existed since
its inception,3 the burdensome effects on a locality’s ability to serve and
protect its citizens are constantly evolving. In particular, localities in Dillon
Rule states have been unable to enact laws that directly address environ-
mental issues, citing the Dillon Rule as their main obstacle.4
Although lobbying Virginia lawmakers for change is possible, chal-
lenges associated with the lobbying process have kept localities within
the Dillon Rule’s restrictive framework.5 In addition to facing resource-
intensive lobbying efforts, localities are hesitant to enact boundary-pushing
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; Editor-in-Chief, William & Mary Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy Review, Volume 45; BA Environmental Studies and Public Policy,
Franklin & Marshall College, 2018, magna cum laude. The author would like to thank
the members of the ELPR Board and staff for their continued dedication to Volume 45.
1 Robert M. de Voursney, The Dillon Rule in Virginia: What’s Broken? What Needs to be
Fixed?, VA.NEWSLETTER(Univ. of VA) Aug. 1992, at 1–2, 4, https://vig.coopercenter.org/sites
/vig/files/Virginia_News_Letter_1992_Vol._68_No._7.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK7V-NKQK].
2 Deirdre Fernandes, Dillon Rule Spawns Odd Requests in Va. Assembly, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Feb. 26, 2011), https://www.pilotonline.com/government/virginia/article_7b9dcc6d-e8ea
-5d0f-858b-a542d3c1fe99.html [https://perma.cc/TUQ8-AFRT].
3 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 330 (2016).
4 See, e.g., Katherine Hafner & Peter Coutu, Plastic Straws No More? Hampton Roads
Catches on to National Environmental Trend, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (July 23, 2018), https://
www.pilotonline.com/news/environment/article_01a96cde-8a9f-11e8-b0c1-5f9419414119
.html [https://perma.cc/5QCM-WSG7].
5 Scott McCaffrey, Arlington Board Optimistic for (Eventual) Success of Solar Legislation,
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legislation due to judicial unpredictability.6 Ultimately, the Dillon Rule
disincentivizes localities from seeking innovative solutions that confront
some of our generation’s greatest environmental challenges.
This Note is not the first call for Virginia’s General Assembly to
consider the adverse effects of this antiquated and ineffective rule.7 The
Commonwealth first contemplated a transition from the Dillon Rule in
1969.8 The state’s legislators drafted and proposed a new provision to the
Virginia Constitution, stating that “[a] charter county or a city may exercise
any power or perform any function which is not denied to it by this
[C]onstitution, by its charter[,] or by laws enacted by the General Assem-
bly.”9 Although similar provisions were included in other states’ constitu-
tions, the Virginia legislature opted against it.10 Recently, there have been
calls for the reconsideration of this rule in economic,11 social justice,12 and
environmental contexts.13
As discussed later in this Note, there is a growing consensus that
localities are better equipped to address local issues than the state leg-
islature.14 This argument is championed and frequently cited by those
who appreciate federalism’s capacity to allow states to create their own
environmental laws and policies.15 In a similar fashion, those closer to an
6 “The inherent vagueness of the standard provides courts with the ability to modify or
retard the local agenda, or to require localities to seek specific enabling acts from the
state.” Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 966 (1991).
7 Dillon’s Rule: Good or Bad for Local Governments?, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE
FAIRFAX AREAEDUC.FUND (Oct. 2004), at 2–3, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5870
6fbb29687f06dd219990/t/5b10a409575d1ff378884313/1527817225112/lwvfa-dillon+rule
-article+Oct+2004+LWVFA+Voter.pdf [https://perma.cc/X54H-H89K].
8 Id. at 2.
9 Id.
10 Richard Schragger, It’s Time for Home Rule in Virginia, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.richmond.com/opinion/columnists/richard-schragger-column
-it-s-time-for-home-rule-in/article_e6232381-4387-5594-acad-1b67e8e855ca.html [https://
perma.cc/R26V-RVJ9].
11 John F. Seymour, Richmond Is Gagging Progressive Local Governments, WASH. POST




13 Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and
Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 875–76, 878 (1990).
14 See, e.g., Kate Barcellos, Bill to Suggest Local Governance, BARRE-MONTPELIER TIMES
ARGUS (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.timesargus.com/news/local/bill-to-suggest-local-gov
ernance/article_ef621159-9a7c-51ef-84cd-0164595169da.html [https://perma.cc/HZY7-38WK].
15 John Larsen, Bottom Line on State and Federal Policy Roles, WORLD RES. INST. (Aug.
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environmental issue, such as representatives of a coastal community
grappling with sea level rise, will presumably understand its particular
challenges more intimately than any state government official.
A number of recent environmental efforts have largely failed due to
Virginia’s outdated policymaking structure.16 In Alexandria, for example,
the locality’s inability to ban plastic bags and straws has sparked heated
debates.17 All in all, localities routinely point to the Dillon Rule to justify
their environmental shortcomings.18
Mixed Rule19 and Home Rule states have surpassed Virginia in the
implementation of progressive environmental efforts in a number of ways.20
Some examples include powerful regional initiatives, such as the South
Florida Regional Climate Change Compact21 and county-led environmental
legislation, such as Washtenaw County, Michigan’s net-zero emissions
efforts in 2018.22 Moreover, this Note will discuss recent full or partial
transitions in states such as West Virginia, Nevada, and Illinois.23
This Note will also contemplate the numerous benefits and chal-
lenges that accompany different transition strategies for Virginia.24 These
transition options include opting for full Home Rule status,25 implementing
public health or environmental exceptions, or allowing Home Rule func-
tionality to municipalities based on desire, size, or through the authori-
zation of home rule charters.26 All in all, this Note will highlight the
2008) at 1, https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/bottom_line_state_fed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KX7U-6PYS].
16 See, e.g., Sarah Vogelsong, Will This Be the Year Virginia Imposes a Plastic Bag Tax?,




19 In this Note, “Mixed Rule States” refers to states that possess a combination of Dillon
Rule and Home Rule components. Eight states fall under this category. Jon D. Russell
& Aaron Bostrom, Federalism, Dillon Rule and Home Rule, AM. CITY CTY. EXCHANGE
(Jan. 2016) at 5, https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon
-House-Rule-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A7G-HDTG].
20 See, e.g., How Counties Are Taking Climate Action, CLIMATEREALITY PROJECT (Apr. 17,
2019), https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/how-counties-are-taking-climate-action
[https://perma.cc/ML2K-J645].
21 About the Compact, SE.FLA.REG’LCLIMATECHANGECOMPACT, https://southeastflorida
climatecompact.org [https://perma.cc/KN5K-4L9U] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
22 How Counties Are Taking Climate Action, supra note 20.
23 See infra Part III.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See infra Section V.A.
26 See infra Section V.B.3.
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reasons why a transition is advisable and why it is a crucial moment for
the Virginia legislature to act.27
A. The Structure of Legislative Power: Federal, State, and Local
Governments
Lawmaking power is shared between the federal, state, and local
governmental structures.28 The United States Constitution explicitly lays
out the areas of law over which the federal government has authority,
including interstate commerce and national security, and leaves the resid-
ual lawmaking power to the states.29 One rationale for this structure is
that the Founders saw the states as being better equipped to address the
localized needs of their citizens.30 In addition, states are frequently seen
as “laboratories” in which law and policy can be tested and refined before
implementation on a larger scale.31 Americans have been consistently
subjected to state-tested national policy, with Massachusetts’ universal
health care legislation being a recent and well-known example.32
After this, each state can determine which powers it will retain,
and which powers it will delegate to its local governments.33 Though state
and local governments differ, the national concern with allowing Congress
to intervene with state-level issues also arises in regard to state control
of local legislation.34 By not recognizing this, we fail to consider the dif-
fering priorities of each individual locality. Even if particular issues
27 See infra Introduction.F.
28 State & Local Government, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white
-house/state-local-government/ [https://perma.cc/2639-PBQN] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2, amend. X.
30 Russell & Bostrom, supra note 19, at 3. In this regard, Alexander Hamilton said, “[i]t
is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to
the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more
attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the commu-
nity at large, the people of each State are apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local
governments than towards the government of the Union.” Id.
31 William Fulton, Have States Lost Their Place as Labs of Democracy?, GOVERNING (Apr.
2007), https://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-states-cities-laboratories
-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/3LNX-TYV7].
32 Barbara Anthony, Beyond Obamacare: Lessons from Massachusetts 2 (Harvard
Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series No. 88, 2017), https://www.hks
.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/82_BeyondObamcare.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MX38-HNCT].
33 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 289.
34 See Michéle Finck, The Role of Localism in Constitutional Change: A Case Study, 30J.L.
& POL. 53, 53–54 (2014) (arguing how localities can be agents for constitutional change).
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affect the entire state, localities will differ on their willingness to take indi-
vidual steps, and subsequent financial burdens, to increase environmental
efforts.35 For example, Virginia’s coastal communities will be more willing
to pass environmental laws that address offshore renewable energy, sea
level rise, or even general plastic use than non-coastal communities.36
B. History of the Dillon Rule
1. Origin
The Dillon Rule was formalized by Judge John F. Dillon in 1873 in
his treatise titled Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations.37
Shortly after being published, it was adopted by many states’ judiciaries
across the country, including Virginia.38 In 1896, the Dillon Rule was first
cited by the Supreme Court of Virginia in City of Winchester v. Redmond.39
In this case, the court relied on Judge Dillon’s treatise to hold that a city
council is not authorized to create rewards for individuals who provide
information that leads to the conviction of arsonists.40 Afterwards, the
Dillon Rule gained additional prominence when the Supreme Court of
the Unites States relied upon it in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh in 1907.41
In 1969, Virginia’s legislature considered, yet voted against, a con-
stitutional amendment to reverse the Dillon Rule.42 The Supreme Court
of Virginia reaffirmed this principle in its 2010 decision, Marble Technolo-
gies Inc. v. City of Hampton.43 In citing Virginia’s Dillon Rule precedent,
35 Patricia Sullivan, Why Arlington and Fairfax Can’t Tax Plastic Bags—And Why That




36 See Jennifer Marlon, Estimated % of Adults Who Think Global Warming is Happening
(72%), 2020, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N (Sept. 17, 2019), https://
climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us/ [https://perma.cc/6DMS-28
79]. With the exception of counties with major cities, the counties of coastal Virginia have
higher percentages of individuals “who think global warming is happening” than the
majority of those counties in the central and western part of the state. Id.
37 Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of Dillon’s
Rule on Growth Management, BROOKINGSINST. 8 (Jan. 2003), https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/dillonsrule.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P36-J4DU].
38 Id. at 8, 45.
39 Winchester v. Redmond, 25 S.E. 1001, 1002 (Va. 1896).
40 Id. at 1002–03.
41 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1907).
42 Schragger, supra note 10.
43 690 S.E.2d 84, 88–89 (Va. 2010).
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this court held that local governments are subordinate state instrumen-
talities.44 Thus, it remains the controlling lawmaking structure today.
According to Judge Dillon, local governments have only three types
of powers: (1) those granted expressly, (2) those necessarily, fairly implied
in, or incident to the powers expressly granted, and (3) those essential to
the declared objectives and purposes of the corporation.45 Judge Dillon
saw localities as susceptible and, thus, in need of more protection from
special interest politics and corruption than their state legislative coun-
terparts.46 Thus, Judge Dillon incorporated a strict construction of local
government powers under the Dillon Rule; if there is any reasonable doubt
as to whether or not a power has been conferred on a local government,
the power has not been conferred.47
It is worth noting that the application of the Dillon Rule, in limited
circumstances, has upheld innovative local measures with the assistance
of creative interpretations by the Supreme Court of Virginia.48 For exam-
ple, in Resource Conservation Management v. Board of Supervisors of
Prince William County, Chief Justice Carrico held that the power to zone,
expressly delegated to localities, implicitly gives localities the power to
prohibit the creation and use of landfills within county lines.49 Unfortu-
nately, local judges have major discretion in deciphering whether or not
a power was passed on to localities. Moreover, minimal guidance is given
by legal precedent to localities on how their arguments for innovative, en-
vironmental reforms would fare in Virginia’s circuit and appellate courts.50
Ultimately, the unpredictability and monetary cost of both lobbying ef-
forts and suits in Virginia’s courts leave environmentally concerned
localities with an unclear path forward.
C. Nonenvironmental Calls for Dillon Rule Reform in Virginia
Though this Note will primarily critique the Virginia application
of the Dillon Rule in an environmental context, it is important to note
44 Id. (citing Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Bd. of Supervisors, 666 S.E.2d 315, 316 (Va. 2008);
City Council of Alexandria v. Lindsey Trts., 520 S.E.2d 181, 182 (Va. 1999); Bd. of Super-
visors v. Countryside Invt. Co., 522 S.E.2d 610, 612–14 (Va. 1999); City of Richmond v.
Confrere Club of Richmond, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va. 1990); Commonwealth v. Bd. of
Arlington Cty., 232 S.E.2d 30, 41 (Va. 1977)).
45 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 337.
46 Id. at 328.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 336.
49 Res. Conservation Mgmt. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 380 S.E.2d 879 (Va. 1989).
50 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 337.
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that since its inception and widespread adoption, critics have advocated
for Dillon Rule reform in order to address a variety of other seminal issues,
including economic,51 social justice,52 and public health53 concerns. These
socioeconomic implications, considered in conjunction with its environ-
mental limitations, strengthen the case for Dillon Rule reform.
1. Minimum Wage
Localities in Virginia are not statutorily authorized to set their own
minimum wage.54 Although wealthier localities have continuously lobbied
state legislators for a local alternative to help their own low-wage workers,
those efforts continue to be rebuffed by Virginia’s state legislature.55 For
example, the state legislature rejected a proposed bill that would have
allowed a locality to adopt a local alternative minimum wage only after
a mandatory quorum.56 This bill imposed no obligation on localities, but
rather merely gave them the option to pursue policy reform.57 Under this
circumstance, it is indisputable that the Dillon Rule has effectively pre-
vented a locality from passing legislation that would have immensely
improved the quality of life of its low-income workers and improved the
equitability of wages across the state.58 As a whole, state laws are cur-
rently operating as a ceiling, from which local laws must match but not
rise above.59 This is problematic because it leaves localities with little to
no room to meet the ever-changing, present needs of their citizens.
2. Smoking Ban
In Harrisonburg and Rockingham counties, local organizations
planned to submit a proposal to its councilmembers in order to prohibit
51 Seymour, supra note 11.
52 Id.
53 Laine Griffin, Proposed Smoking Ban Hits Snag, DAILY NEWS RECORD (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.dnronline.com/news/harrisonburg/proposed-smoking-ban-hits-snag/article
_c7e46969-b196-51fe-94d5-96dd74e89b4c.html [https://perma.cc/D7SL-9RKZ].
54 Jared Bernstein, Cities Would Like to Raise Their Minimum Wages, Too, But States




56 See H.B. 39, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018).
57 See id.; Seymour, supra note 11.
58 Bernstein, supra note 54.
59 This is in comparison to a state law acting as a floor, from which localities can provide
stricter or more protective laws for its citizens.
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tobacco use at parks and recreational facilities predominately used by
children.60 Instead of considering whether this power was arguably given
implicitly to localities, or lobbying the state legislature for this power so
they could revise their code, council members instead told interested
parties that Virginia’s counties are not authorized to enact this type of
regulation.61 In lieu of this, these organizations are planning to promote
a voluntary public awareness campaign to discourage smoking in public
areas where children are likely to be present.62 This example not only
clearly points to the specific limitations in the Dillon Rule’s legal doctrine,
but also the implications, based on human nature, of such a role. In this
context, it is only logical that localities will choose to tell its constituents
that they are unable to enact a particular rule rather than explaining
that the onus was on the locality to lobby the state legislature for state
code reform.
3. Hostile Community Environments
a. Symbols of White Supremacy
Removing symbols of white supremacy from public areas has had
widespread support for many years.63 However, state and local govern-
ments have only recently begun to respond.64 Participating governments
have prioritized the safety and well-being of its citizens by removing promi-
nent symbols of white supremacy’s hold on American society, including
Civil War memorials, statues, and street names.65 Despite the tension
and discomfort felt by many constituents, localities continue to use the
Dillon Rule as a scapegoat to justify their inaction.66 For example, despite
60 Griffin, supra note 53.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Zach Rosenthal, New Law Allows Virginia Localities to Remove Confederate Statues
and Monuments, CAVALIER DAILY (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.cavalierdaily.com/article
/2020/04/new-law-allows-virginia-localities-to-remove-confederate-statues-and-monu
ments [https://perma.cc/2X7Q-9GMU].
64 Jess R. Phelps & Jessica Owley, Etched in Stone: Historic Preservation Law and Con-
federate Monuments, 71 FLA.L.REV. 627, 630 (2019) (noting that the calls for the removal
of confederate statues heightened in the wake of the killings in Charleston and
Charlottesville).
65 Seymour, supra note 11; Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a
City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 58 (2018).
66 Amanda Lineberry, Payne v. City of Charlottesville and the Dillon’s Rule Rationale for
Removal, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 45 (2018).
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persistent calls from constituents in Arlington County to rename Jeffer-
son Davis Highway, the state legislature refused to do so or allow locali-
ties to do it themselves by granting them express powers through the
Virginia code.67 In April 2020, the General Assembly voted to amend the
Virginia code to allow “local governing bodies” to remove publicly owned
monuments or memorials, but only after “publish[ing] notice of such intent
in a newspaper” and a public hearing.68
b. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
Prior to the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment,69 Virginia’s
strict adherence to the Dillon Rule impeded localities’ efforts to ensure
equal treatment of citizens on the basis of sexual orientation.70 Although
Virginia’s Human Rights Act (“VHRA”) provides protections to groups his-
torically discriminated against, it does not provide all of the protections
that some localities would want for its citizens.71 More specifically, VHRA
does not mention protections based on sexual orientation.72 In the under-
lying political context, much of this debate has centered around the con-
flicting values of civil rights and religious freedoms.73 However, on the
surface, the focus of these debates has been on the Dillon Rule.74 Bono v.
Arlington County Human Rights Commission exemplifies this discussion.75
67 Seymour, supra note 11.
68 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812(B) (2020); Rosenthal, supra note 63.
69 Virginia Adds LGBTQ Protections to Anti-Discrimination Law, MCGUIREWOODS (Apr. 14,
2020), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2020/4/virginia-adds-lgbtq
-protections-to-anti-discrimination-law [https://perma.cc/23KB-79UR].
70 Sarah Miller, Virginia Is for Business Owners Who Feel the Human Rights Commission
Poses A Threat to Their Religious Liberties, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 659, 671–72
(2008).
71 As outlined in the 2018 [Municipality Equality Index] report, . . . cities
with a dedication to equality in Virginia will essentially never be able
to score as well as cities in non-Dillon rule states with a comparable
dedication to equality. In Virginia, Arlington County was recognized
alongside Richmond as municipalities that managed to score high on
the MEI index without supportive [state] laws.
Lia Tabackman, Richmond Recognized by Human Rights Campaign as a City ‘Leading
the Way to LGBTQ Equality,’ CBS 6 NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://wtvr.com/2018/10/12
/richmond-recognized-by-human-rights-campaign-as-a-city-leading-the-way-to-lgbtq
-equality/ [https://perma.cc/D8ZY-SSP5].
72 See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (2001).
73 Miller, supra note 70, at 665.
74 Id. at 660.
75 Bono v. Arlington County Human Rights Comm’n, 72 Va. Cir. 256, 256–59 (2006).
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In 2006, Lilli Vincenz asked Tim Bono, owner of a production company,
to duplicate two videos.76 After reading the two videos’ titles, “Gay and
Proud” and “Second Largest Minority,” Bono refused, saying that it would
“go against his Christian values.”77 Vincenz filed a complaint with the
Arlington Human Rights Commission (“AHRC”), alleging that Bono vio-
lated Arlington’s Human Rights Code of Ordinances.78 After the AHRC
sided with Vincenz, Bono filed a claim stating that Arlington County over-
stepped its authority by labeling sexual orientation as a protected classi-
fication in its local code, when the state’s code had not included these
protections.79 Soon after, the AHRC dismissed the case.80 This case serves
as only one example of how the Dillon Rule remains the legal vehicle by
which localities refuse to address their constituents’ needs. In these in-
stances, reliance on the Dillon Rule is not based on Judge Dillon’s initial
fears of local government corruption,81 but rather based on an underlying
opposition to reform with progressive measures.
D. Localities Are Complacent in the Dillon Rule Context
From its inception, the Dillon Rule was never meant to impede
localities from resolving their citizens’ ever-changing needs, but rather
it was meant merely to facilitate state oversight.82 However, in practice,
the Dillon Rule is a tedious roadblock that disincentivizes attempts at
local policy reform.83
Localities may lobby to the state’s legislature for reconsideration
of certain provisions in Virginia’s Code.84 Yet, in reality, localities often
lack resources or political influence to accomplish their ultimate goals.85
In many cases, interest groups representing localities conclude that
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 Miller, supra note 70, at 671; Liberty Counsel Defends Christian Businessman Ordered
to Duplicate Homosexual Videos, LIBERTY COUNSEL (May 2, 2006), https://www.lc.org
/newsroom/details/liberty-counsel-defends-christian-businessman-ordered-to-duplicate
-homosexual-videos-1 [https://perma.cc/YZ42-M3LB].
79 Miller, supra note 70, at 672.
80 Id.
81 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 328.
82 Id.
83 Richardson, Jr., supra note 37, at 14.
84 Id.
85 Regionalism and the Dillon Rule, OLDDOMINIONUNIV.(2001), https://www.odu.edu/con
tent/dam/odu/offices/economic-forecasting-project/docs/2001chapter6.pdf [https://perma.cc
/AVW2-V3DA].
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lobbying will not survive a realistic cost-benefit analysis.86 For this
reason, the Dillon Rule carries the unintended consequence of convincing
smaller, poorer, or otherwise less powerful localities to give up on reforms
that substantially benefit their citizens.87 In other words, Virginia’s use
of the Dillon Rule “cripples its municipal corporations by injecting uncer-
tainty into the process of enacting local legislation and by making local
leaders reticent to enact progressive measures lest they be challenged or
overruled outright.”88
E. Virginia’s Environmental Shortcomings
With its vast and diverse landscape within the Mid-Atlantic region,
Virginia is host to a number of unique, regional environmental issues. On
the coast, Virginia is vulnerable to issues such as sea level rise, recurrent
flooding, and an increase in extreme weather events.89 Rural communi-
ties are susceptible to environmental concerns such as water pollution,90
species diversity loss,91 and the health risks of various pesticides used in
the farming industry.92 Virginia as a whole also faces national environ-
mental issues including widespread ozone pollution emitted from motor
vehicles,93 and a changing climate more generally.94
86 Gillette, supra note 6, at 979 (suggesting that strong lobbying efforts by one group
receive much of the attention of the lawmakers at the general public’s expense).
87 Id. at 984 (“This, I suggest, is the moving force behind (or at least an ex post justification
of) Dillon’s Rule. Where interaction among players leads to decreasing social returns, and
devastating returns for those who do not win, the superior strategy for all is often not to
play the game.”).
88 Miller, supra note 70, at 662–63.
89 See generally Climate Change, CHESAPEAKEBAY FOUND., https://www.cbf.org/issues/cli
mate-change/ [https://perma.cc/95QJ-MYAN] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
90 See generally Agriculture, CHESAPEAKEBAY FOUND., https://www.cbf.org/issues/agricul
ture/ [https://perma.cc/8XLK-ABLN] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
91 See generally Fisheries, CHESAPEAKEBAY FOUND., https://www.cbf.org/issues/fisheries/
[https://perma.cc/KDR9-FJ66] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
92 See generally Louis A. Helfrich et al., Pesticides and Aquatic Animals: A Guide to Re-
ducing Impacts on Aquatic Systems, VA. COOP. EXTENSION (2009), https://www.pubs.ext
.vt.edu/420/420-013/420-013.html [https://perma.cc/CB5X-7YQU].
93 Virginia Air Quality Depends on Where You Live, SIERRA CLUB (Apr. 18, 2018), https://
www.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2018/04/virginia-air-quality-depends-where-you-live
[https://perma.cc/72VP-WED8].
94 See What Climate Change Means for Virginia, EPA (2016), https://19january2017snap
shot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/climate-change-va.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9K9J-SJXG].
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F. The Dillon Rule: Stifling Virginia’s Environmental and Other
Types of Progressive Efforts
Virginia’s strict adherence to the Dillon Rule has impeded progres-
sive, local environmental efforts. There are a number of largely popular
environmental initiatives, such as plastic bag and straw bans, which
Virginia’s localities cannot implement without express authorization in
Virginia’s code.95 In order for localities to meet the constantly evolving
public welfare desires of their citizens, they must be equipped with more
effective tools from Virginia’s legislature or judiciary.
In the legislative context, Virginia’s General Assembly has histor-
ically been hesitant to discuss real structural change for a number of rea-
sons.96 First, Virginia’s localities have learned how to operate, albeit less
successfully, within this flawed system.97 This familiarity with the Dillon
Rule framework has led localities to ensure that their policies are not overly
progressive as to fall outside of this framework.98
Secondly, the General Assembly has distinctly political reasons for
refusing to consider a Dillon Rule transition.99 As is true at the national
level, environmental concerns are partisan.100 All in all, environmental
efforts are more likely to be proposed and passed by Democratic policy-
makers.101 In Virginia’s political context, prior to the 2019 election, Repub-
licans had held a majority in either the House or the Senate for over two
decades.102 During this time, as opposed to outright denying environmental




99 Brad Kutner, 150-Year-Old Precedent Faces Changes in New, Blue Virginia, COURT-
HOUSENEWSSERV. (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/150-year-old-prece
dent-faces-changes-in-new-blue-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/BCW6-RQGY].
100 See Joseph Majkut, Report: The Growing Partisan Divide on the Environment, NIS-
KANENCTR. (May 16, 2018), https://www.niskanencenter.org/report-the-growing-partisan
-divide-on-the-environment/ [https://perma.cc/B3VJ-J9X7].
101 “For example, 71% of Democrats said policies aimed at reducing climate change generally
provide net benefits for the environment, compared with roughly three-in-ten Republicans.”
Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change in 5 Charts, PEW
RSCH.CTR. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/19/how-ameri
cans-see-climate-change-in-5-charts/ [https://perma.cc/53S5-D6KB].
102 Gregory S. Schneider & Laura Vozzella, Democrats Flip Virginia Senate and House,
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policies based on a legitimate difference in legislative priorities, Republi-
cans in power used the Dillon Rule in order to deny a locality the power to
enact environmental policies.103 Now that both chambers of the General
Assembly have gained a Democratic majority, the calls for Dillon Rule re-
form are reinvigorated and have become more realistic.104
In addition, the General Assembly has unequally applied the Dillon
Rule between the localities. For example, the General Assembly, at times,
will expressly give authorities to one locality and not another.105 Although
Dillon Rule supporters claim that it promotes equal treatment under the
law,106 allowing localities to lobby for permission to do a particular action
contributes to inequality among the localities. As logic follows, the wealth-
ier localities are more likely to attract the attention of the Virginia legisla-
ture in order for them to enact a particular law. To a certain degree,
localities have become the interest groups that Judge Dillon feared.107
Secondly, inequality arises when localities are the primary advo-
cates for a specific policy change. Localities, acting as lobbyists, will pre-
dominately advocate for the specific policy goals that meet their particular
needs.108 As a result, the resulting policy runs the risk of being underin-
clusive, or reflecting the lobbying locality’s preferences.109 This amplifies
inequality between localities that are struggling with the same issues.110
103 Kutner, supra note 99.
104 Sullivan, supra note 35.
105 See, e.g., VA. CODE § 18.2-287.4 (2016). This Virginia Code section limits a restriction
on carrying semi-automatic guns to a handful of cities and counties. Other localities
throughout Virginia have considered this ban, but would have to ultimately lobby the
General Assembly to include its name to the list of counties authorized to ban these
weapons. Brie Jackson, Roanoke City Council Considering Ban on Certain Types of Guns,
Plan Drawing Controversy, WSLS 10NEWS (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.wsls.com/news
/2016/09/20/roanoke-city-council-considering-ban-on-certain-types-of-guns-plan-drawing
-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/V9VJ-9SR6].
106 de Voursney, supra note 1.
107 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 328.
108 See generally Gillette, supra note 6, at 975–76.
109 Id.
The problem is that, in each of these cases, it is unlikely that the
[lobbyists] will provide the exact [lobbying] in the exact form that the
public at large would prefer . . . . Even if some are willing to [lobby for
all localities], they will only [ask for] the quantity and quality of the
[policy] necessary to satisfy personal, rather than social preferences,
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Multiple states have grappled with the unintended failings of the
Dillon Rule by creating general exceptions.111 Some of these exceptions
include letting localities attain Home Rule functionality if they meet
several requirements112 or by becoming a Home Rule state altogether.113
Even though these exceptions have their own benefits and shortcomings,
they all serve the ultimate goal of expanding their localities’ authority in
order to implement new environmental efforts. Adherence to an antiquated,
ineffective Dillon Rule leaves Virginia’s localities ill-equipped to resolve
the unique environmental challenges faced by their constituents.114
I. VIRGINIA’S DILLON RULE CONFLICTS WITH EXISTING
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORTS
As concerns regarding the sustainability of our global and regional
environments continue to increase, a number of localities within Virginia,
as well as in other Dillon Rule states, have grown weary of the limitations
that pure Dillon Rule adherence places on environmental efforts.115 Since
these environmental issues will not be resolved without governmental
and community intervention, this section will also consider other impor-
tant environmental issues that conflict with Virginia’s current lawmak-
ing structure.
A. Plastic Bans
Images of marine wildlife suffering at the hands of six-pack rings,
grocery store bags, and plastic straws have sparked a progressive move-
ment of plastic bans across the country.116 Although Virginians share this
sentiment, the Dillon Rule is often invoked by local politicians to prevent
appropriate legislation from moving forward.117 For example, councilmem-
bers in Virginia Beach, Chesapeake, Portsmouth, Newport News, and
111 See infra Section V.B.1.
112 Id.
113 See infra Section V.A.
114 “ ‘It certainly can be frustrating if you’re pursuing a local issue that isn’t relevant to
the rest of the state,’ said Randy Keaton, interim executive director of the Hampton
Roads Planning District Commission.” Virginia Lascara, Dillon Rule Has Friends and
Foes, VA.PILOT (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.pilotonline.com/inside-business/article_deba
c1b1-a048-533f-8c87-c1cef92b17c5.html [https://perma.cc/Y5W4-DYEZ].
115 See Butler, supra note 13, at 875.
116 See generally Dan Bilefsky, Canada Plans to Ban Single-Use Plastics, Joining Growing
Global Movement, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/world
/canada/single-use-plastic-ban.html [https://perma.cc/GT35-VRCX].
117 Hafner & Coutu, supra note 4.
2020] BREAKING UP WITH DILLON 261
Hampton have cited the Dillon Rule as the reason for why they cannot
meet their citizens’ requests.118 Furthermore, it highlights the localities’
common default of working within the Dillon Rule framework, instead of
creatively venturing out of it in order to meet local needs.119 When asked
about a potential plastic ban, Norfolk Councilwoman Andria McClellan
stated that “[w]hile we can’t currently impose a ban, we do want to provide
the carrot instead of the stick,” referencing its 2018 public awareness
campaign that provided one hundred social media users with reusable
straws.120 While raising public awareness to the dangers of plastic use to
marine wildlife is important, the Dillon Rule serves as a major proce-
dural roadblock to structural change, and instead incentivizes localities
to opt for minimally effective policies that can be implemented within the
existing Dillon Rule framework.121
B. Solar Legislation
Virginia’s communities, such as Arlington County, have expressed
to the General Assembly their desire to promote locally a greater renew-
able energy presence.122 The ongoing battle for solar legislation exempli-
fies how the Dillon Rule’s framework, coupled with partisan policymaking
efforts, has prevented localities from addressing concerned calls from their
citizens.123 Even in localities that are monetarily equipped to incessantly
lobby their state legislators, an opposing political majority can halt a string
of progressive policies from being implemented.124
In the solar context, a number of localities throughout northern
Virginia and the Richmond suburbs, with the knowledge that the Dillon
Rule would preclude them from passing any local solar legislation,
persuaded several state legislators to introduce bills that would amend
118 Id.
119 “Dillon’s Rule benefits local government officials by allowing them to use the rule as
an excuse to not do things that the public wants.” Richardson, Jr., supra note 37, at 14.
120 Hafner & Coutu, supra note 4.
121 See Richardson, Jr., supra note 37, at 14–15; see generally Paul Hawkins, Waging War
on the Rising Seas: Fashioning a Comprehensive Approach to Combating the Effects of Sea
Level Rise on Hampton Roads, Virginia Military Installations Under Existing Frameworks,
41 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 283 (2016).
122 McCaffrey, supra note 5; Ivy Main, How the General Assembly Failed Virginia Again
on Clean Energy, VA. MERCURY (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.virginiamercury.com/2019
/03/11/how-the-general-assembly-failed-virginia-again-on-clean-energy/ [https://perma
.cc/P74N-5G8P].
123 McCaffrey, supra note 5; Main, supra note 122.
124 Id.
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the pertinent sections of the Virginia code.125 Unfortunately, these bills
suffered lopsided, partisan defeats.126 Arlington County Board member
Libby Garvey has stated that although “[w]e can’t do anything unless the
state gives us permission,” within the “confines of existing state law,
Arlington does try to push for incentives to encourage more use of solar
power.”127 Councilmember Garvey’s statements exemplify the sentiment
that the current Dillon Rule framework is effectively stifling localities’
ability to adequately meet their citizens’ needs.128 It forces them to either
seek muted policies that fit into the existing frameworks or worse, aban-
don a policy goal altogether.129
C. Other Environmental Problems Virginians Are Unlikely to
Address
As states and localities continue to spearhead the nation’s envi-
ronmental initiatives130 and their constituents continue to experience the
dramatic effects of an ever-changing climate,131 Virginia’s environmental
responsibilities will only increase. A discussion of how Virginia’s law-
making restrictions preclude various policy initiatives implemented by
other states will be discussed below.
1. Building Energy Requirements
A popular way to reduce energy use in any community is by in-
creasing the energy efficiency of its buildings.132 Each state would create
a building energy code program for residential and commercial buildings.133
125 McCaffrey, supra note 5; Main, supra note 122.
126 See Main, supra note 122. See, e.g., H.B. 2329, Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019);
H.B. 1928, Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019).
127 See McCaffrey, supra note 5.
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 See Hillary Rosner, How State and Local Governments Are Leading the Way on Climate
Policy, AUDUBONMAG. (2019), https://www.audubon.org/magazine/fall-2019/how-state-and-lo
cal-governments-are-leading-way [https://perma.cc/RF5D-P3FH]; Andrea McArdle, Local
Green Initiatives: What Local Governance Can Contribute to Environmental Defenses Against
the Onslaughts of Climate Change, 28 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 102, 102–03 (2016).
131 McArdle, supra note 130, at 102.
132 City Climate Policy, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es
.org/content/city-climate-policy/ [https://perma.cc/4PBS-GGY5] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
133 See, e.g., Building Energy Codes Program: Virginia, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://
www.energycodes.gov/adoption/states/virginia [https://perma.cc/45AT-39TZ] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2020).
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These programs set the mandatory levels of energy efficiency for existing
and future buildings in each jurisdiction.134 In Home Rule states or states
that entrust cities with more autonomy, cities are free to set higher
building energy code requirements than the state’s minimum.135 For
example, in new buildings, some localities impose LEED or Energy Star
Certification requirements.136
In Georgia, a Home Rule state, localities can set their own build-
ing energy codes.137 To assist localities with choosing appropriate stan-
dards, the state provides two optional building codes available to any
jurisdiction to adopt, including, a state minimum standard and a green
building standard.138
In contrast, localities in Dillon Rule states cannot surpass the
state-assigned level for building energy efficiency standards.139 According
to the Virginia Building Energy Codes Program, “all jurisdictions, cities,
counties, and towns must comply to [the state’s energy] code.”140 This
massively reduces the strides counties and cities can make to reduce the
state’s overall energy use.141 Localities in Virginia who seek to promote
green building development can only use positive, voluntary incentives,
such as the fast tracking of building permits.142
The Dillon Rule can be especially restrictive for localities located in
states that do not prioritize strengthening their Building Energy Code Pro-
grams.143 As localities continue to be a massive source of environmentally
134 Id.
135 In Home Rule states, the energy code’s “Jurisdictional Adoption” will contain “State
as Minimum,” indicating that localities can enact laws that strengthen the energy code
standards above the state minimum. See Building Energy Codes Program: Florida, U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energycodes.gov/adoption/states/florida [https://perma.cc
/2DAA-BNDX] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
136 City Climate Policy, supra note 132.
137 Energy Code Stringency, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., https://data
base.aceee.org/city/energy-code-stringency [https://perma.cc/383M-WN9H] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2020).
138 Id.
139 Virginia’s Energy Code Program is designated “mandatory.” Building Energy Codes
Program: Virginia, supra note 133.
140 Id.
141 See Andrae J. Via, Local Green Building Incentives: Overcoming the Dillon Rule in
Virginia, WILLIAMS MULLEN (Dec. 6, 2010), https://www.williamsmullen.com/news/local
-green-building-incentives-overcoming-dillon-rule-virginia [https://perma.cc/KM5K-BEG2];
see, e.g., Energy Code Stringency, supra note 137.
142 Via, supra note 141; Energy Code Stringency, supra note 137.
143 See, e.g., Building Energy Codes Program: Virginia, supra note 133.
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friendly energy use within each state, those within a Dillon Rule state will
be handicapped in their quest to reduce its carbon emissions.144
2. Renewable Energy Requirements
The Dillon Rule also limits localities from enacting mandatory
green energy requirements.145 The challenges faced by Arlington, a county
of roughly 237,000 constituents, provides a telling story of such limita-
tions.146 The county’s newly adopted Community Energy Plan establishes
a goal of becoming carbon neutral by 2050.147 According to Rich Dooley,
Arlington’s Community Energy Coordinator, the Dillon Rule prevents
Arlington from “requir[ing] developers to build energy-efficient buildings
above what is required by the state” and can only offer incentives, such
as bonus density, for going above Virginia’s standards.148
II. SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IMPLEMENTED BY MIXED OR HOME RULE
STATES
A. Regional Efforts
Florida’s Home Rule status allowed for the creation of the South
Florida Climate Change Compact (“Compact”), which has become a model
for the country in regional climate change legislation.149 According to the
Compact, it achieves its goals by “coordinat[ing] [climate] mitigation and
adaptation activities across county lines” among Broward, Miami-Dade,
Monroe, and Palm Beach counties.150 Some of its work includes establish-
ing requirements for “state agencies, water management districts, local
governments, and regulated industries (e.g., electric utilities) to consider
projected sea-level rise, coastal flooding, and potential storm surge in all
144 City Climate Policy, supra note 132.
145 Vernon Miles, Arlington Scales Up Community Energy Plan Ambitions Despite
Feasibility Concerns, ARLINGTON NOW (July 11, 2019), https://www.arlnow.com/2019/07
/11/arlington-scales-up-community-energy-plan-ambitions-despite-feasibility-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/VT8U-3GYU].
146 Arlington County, Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/arlingtoncountyvirginia [https://perma.cc/R7WR-FYL3] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
147 Miles, supra note 145.
148 Id.
149 SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, supra note 21.
150 What is the Compact?, SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, https://southeastflo
ridaclimatecompact.org/about-us/what-is-the-compact/ [https://perma.cc/ZXE6-26ND]
(last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
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infrastructure and facility-siting decisions” within their counties.151 These
efforts would not be possible without Florida’s Home Rule status.152 The
counties contained within the Compact are primarily responsible for
implementing the Compact’s initiatives through local policymaking.153
Furthermore, it serves as an example of the benefits that materialize when
local governments are permitted to confront their own pressing environ-
mental issues. A similar Compact could easily be mimicked in southeast-
ern Virginia to mitigate the effects of excessive sea level rise.154
B. County-Wide Environmental Efforts
Several states have begun to shift away from a traditional Dillon
Rule structure by awarding counties Home Rule status while simultane-
ously maintaining its grip on a locality’s individual lawmaking.155 Counties
can be powerful forces in effectuating environmental goals such as reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and increasing reliance on renewable energy.156
For example, Washtenaw County, Michigan, began its climate change
mitigation efforts by establishing the County Environmental Council with
the ultimate goal of achieving “net-zero emissions for county operations by
2035.”157 In addition, some of the programs enacted by Washtenaw County
include “green purchasing policies for county operations, such as a ban
on plastic straws and some single-use plastics, and a land conservation
program protecting over 3,000 acres of natural area and farmland.”158
In a similar fashion, allowing Virginia’s counties to exercise Home
Rule authority would facilitate enormous strides in counties struggling
with environmental concerns. This approach also authorizes a county
commission to oversee the legislative process as opposed to giving each
county full lawmaking authority, which can effectively quell fears of
government corruption.159
151 2019 State Energy, Climate, and Resilience Legislative Principles, SE. FLA. REG’L
CLIMATECHANGECOMPACT (Oct. 29, 2018), https://southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/wp
-content/uploads/2018/11/2019-Compact-state-principles-APPROVED.pdf [https://perma
.cc/HQK4-W4CR].
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C. Dillon Rule States with Carved out Exceptions
Some states retain the Dillon Rule as their default doctrine, while
carving out special exceptions for various types of municipalities in order
to meet their unique governmental needs.160 For example, in Kansas, the
Dillon Rule does not apply to counties.161 Additionally, in Texas, cities may
adopt the Home Rule if their population exceeds 5,000 and they adopt a
charter.162 If applicable, they can “adopt, publish, amend, or repeal an ordi-
nance, rule, or police regulation that is for the good government, peace,
or order of the municipality.”163 This language emphasizes Texas’s com-
mitment to the resolution of uniquely local issues.164
III. EXAMPLES OF OTHER STATE TRANSITIONS
This section will examine the reasons for and the process by which
West Virginia, Nevada, and Illinois have transitioned from traditional Dil-
lon Rule states to those with innovative governmental structures. Addition-
ally, it will also consider the perceived successfulness of each initiative.
A. West Virginia’s Pilot Program
West Virginia has long contemplated a switch from Dillon Rule
adherence.165 In 2007, the legislature finally enacted the Municipal Home
Rule Pilot Program (“Program”) to show participating localities why more
local power in their hands is beneficial to West Virginians.166 This program
empowered participating localities to pass local ordinances not otherwise
available in Dillon Rule states.167 The Program started with four cities,
but expanded rapidly through the years to include thirty-four.168 In 2018,
160 Russell & Bostrom, supra note 19, at 5.
161 Id.
162 Id.; TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 51.072 (1987).




165 Willard D. Lorensen, Rethinking the West Virginia Municipal Code of 1969, 97 W. VA.
L. REV. 653, 655–58 (1995).
166 The West Virginia Municipal Home Rule Program, W. VA. DEP’T OF REV., https://
revenue.wv.gov/homerule/Pages/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/4UGK-MLWT] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2020).
167 Id.
168 Shauna Johnson, Home Rule Is Becoming a Permanent Option for West Virginia’s
Cities, METRONEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), http://wvmetronews.com/2019/03/27/home-rule-is-be
coming-a-permanent-option-for-west-virginias-cities/ [https://perma.cc/8SNX-72U7]; see
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the Program’s success was highlighted at the West Virginia Municipal
League Conference by Dave Hardy, Secretary of West Virginia’s Depart-
ment of Revenue.169 Hardy explained how the Program sparked initia-
tives by cities to solve problems specific to their communities.170 Some
ordinances enacted during this time include the allowance of Sunday
brunch alcohol sales, selling municipal property without an auction, and
even addressing traffic issues involving state roads.171
The Mayor of Huntington, West Virginia, Steve Williams, praised
the program, noting that “Home Rule allows options besides a ‘one size fits
all’ approach to problems that ignore the differences between cities and
regions.”172 Due to its widespread success and favorable calls from constitu-
ents across the state, the 2019 Legislature amended their statute to make
the Program permanent, opening it to all of West Virginia’s municipali-
ties.173 Although this example highlights the dramatic steps Virginia’s
General Assembly could take, it could also use this Program, which was
widely popular with both West Virginia’s legislature and its citizens,174
as a template if it desires.
B. Nevada
Nevada’s Legislature also recently transitioned to traditional Home
Rule status in 2015.175 Nevada Senate Bill 29 granted counties a limited
Home Rule, which functionally granted them the authority to pass ordi-
nances upon “matters of local concern that are not otherwise governed by
generally Special Report: Municipal Home Rule Program, W.VA.LEG.AUDITOR (Nov. 2012),
http://www.wvlegislature.gov/Joint/PERD/perdrep/HomeRule_11_2012.pdf [https://perma
.cc/C8MT-D46E].
169 Connor Griffith, Home Rule Perks and Success Stories Detailed at Municipal League
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174 See W. Va. Code § 8-1-5A (2017); Adams, supra note 173.
175 Limited Functional Home Rule: Additional Powers Granted to Counties Through
SB29, NEV. ASS’N OF CNTYS. (2015), http://www.nvnaco.org/wp-content/uploads/NACO
-Home-Rule-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2738-3PSA].
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state or federal laws.”176 As noted above, counties can be powerful allies
in achieving prosperous environmental goals.177 This type of transition
could be enticing to Virginia’s lawmakers, as they would still retain full
authority to address the prominent statewide or local issues, while also
letting counties address local issues that are solely important to their
constituents without having to lobby for state code revisions.
Moreover, this bill passed with emphatic support because it did
not abandon the Dillon Rule in its entirety.178 Instead, the Nevada legis-
lature simply acknowledged that in its current form it was serving adverse
goals and that “a strict . . . application of Dillon’s Rule unnecessarily re-
stricts a board of county commissioners from taking appropriate actions . . .
to address matters of local concern . . . and thereby impedes the board
from responding to and serving the needs of local citizens diligently, de-
cisively and effectively.”179 Nevada’s localities must continue to fully
engage with the Dillon Rule, and counties must acquiesce to the state
when it has explicitly spoken on a particular issue through legislation.180
This lawmaking structure accounts for both the flexibility counties desire
to meet local needs and the ultimate oversight power the state seeks to
maintain.181 Nevada’s experiment can serve Virginia as an alternative
template for transitioning away from the Dillon Rule, as it highlights a
method of effective compromise between the state and its counties.182
C. Illinois
Prior to 1971, the limits encountered by Illinois’ municipalities and
counties resembled the limits in Virginia.183 Many communities in Illinois
found constant oversight by the state to be inefficient and an impediment
to their personal goals.184 In 1971, the Illinois legislature amended its
176 Id.
177 How Counties Are Taking Climate Action, supra note 20.
178 Kurt Hildebrand, Counties Welcome Home Rule Legislation, NEV. APPEAL (June 11,
2015), https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/government/counties-welcome-home-rule-leg
islation/ [https://perma.cc/9M9N-5CXR].
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https://www.prevention.org/Resources/cb13ac9e-6945-40f1-8097-a46b30ef77ea
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Constitution to create Home Rule municipalities.185 According to Illinois’
Constitution, localities with more than 25,000 citizens obtain automatic
Home Rule status, and smaller localities may adopt Home Rule status
through referendum if they have a chief executive officer.186 The state
legislature can still retain ultimate authority by reserving power to the
state through a majority vote in both houses.187
This version of the Home Rule has been a successful system in
Illinois for a number of years.188 In fact, the legislature is considering
further expansion of the doctrine by offering automatic Home Rule status
to localities with more than 5,000 citizens.189 This route is intriguing for
Virginia, as it considered (1) the benefits of having larger jurisdictions be
responsible for their own local issues, (2) how smaller localities can do
the same with a constituent majority and a chief executive officer manag-
ing the lawmaking of the locality, and (3) how to keep ultimate oversight
authority within the state legislature.190 If Virginia were to pursue adop-
tion of a similar route, it would require collective lobbying by localities to
the new Democratic majority in the General Assembly191 and, ultimately,
an amendment to Virginia’s Constitution.192
IV. CHALLENGES OF A TRANSITION
A. Dillon Rule Is Precedent in Virginia
First, the Dillon Rule has been unwavering precedent in the state
since the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Winchester v. Redmond in
1896.193 In the vast majority of instances, localities have met their citizens’
requests under the current doctrine or publicly admonished it as the main
reason for its inability to meet citizen desires.194
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B. Benefits of the Dillon Rule
Proponents of the Dillon Rule constantly cite a number of proven
benefits.195 First, the Dillon Rule promotes the uniformity of law and
practice across the state, which in turn promotes fair business and social
practices between cities.196 It ensures that localities do not pass business-
friendly legislation that would draw needed jobs and resources from other
parts of the state.197 It also guarantees that citizens’ rights do not differ
from locality to locality by vesting this authority exclusively in the state
government.198 Secondly, it also limits “local corruption and fiscal irre-
sponsibility.”199 In this way, the Dillon Rule promotes informed decision-
making and legislation that is less likely to be influenced by strong
interest groups in the community.200
C. The Grass Is Always Greener: Problems with Home Rule
1. Locality Inequality
As discussed above, one of the Dillon Rule’s main purposes is to
prevent localities from providing distinct rights, privileges, and opportu-
nities from one another.201 For example, it is commonly accepted at the
national level that corporations favor states with laws that align with
their business interests.202 However, the same analysis follows when
viewing businesses from an intrastate perspective.203 Allowing localities
to pass business-friendly laws or, conversely, allowing localities the ability
to place environmental restrictions on business practices, would lead to
unhealthy competition between them.204 At the intrastate level, this is
195 See Russell & Bostrom, supra note 19, at 4.
196 Id.
197 “From an economic development standpoint, it creates an even playing field and sta-
bility,” said Ira Agricola, executive vice president and head of government affairs at the
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce. “Virginia is one of the top states to do business;
you have to say that a Dillon Rule is a big part of that. It makes up the pro business envi-
ronment and the low tax environment, and the predictability of the government.” Lascara,
supra note 114.
198 Richardson, Jr., supra note 37, at 15.
199 Dillon’s Rule: Good or Bad for Local Governments?, supra note 7.
200 Richardson, Jr., supra note 37, at 15.
201 Id.
202 See generally Best States for Business, FORBES (2019), https://www.forbes.com/best
-states-for-business/list/ [https://perma.cc/W6US-PTAL] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
203 Lascara, supra note 114.
204 Id.
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concerning because the failing of individual localities reflects the failing
of the state as a whole.205 The more dire the economic state of a particu-
lar locality, the more the state must step in to financially assist them.206
Because states would prefer to discourage this type of competition
between localities, a regime that allows for this vying for citizens, busi-
nesses, and economic benefits is a perceived disadvantage of Home Rule
states.207 However, as referenced throughout this Note, the Dillon Rule
carries its own set of concerns with inequality.208
2. Preemption
Unfortunately, although more power is initially given to localities
in Home Rule states, authority still remains with a state legislature to
revoke that power by passing legislation that explicitly reserves a specific
area for them.209 This concept is known as state preemption.210 It has
been primarily used when a locality’s lawmaking authority moves beyond
the point at which the state legislature is comfortable.211 In these cases,
a state legislature can introduce a bill revoking the locality’s lawmaking
authority in regard to a particular issue.212 For example, many localities
have sought to increase their minimum wage above the $7.25 an hour
federal minimum, even when their states refused to do so.213 In Home
Rule states, localities can pass a law that increases their minimum wage,
so long as the state legislature does not preempt them.214
Although this is frequently cited as a weakness solely found in
Home Rule states, preemption statutes can be enacted whether or not a
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state follows the Dillon Rule, Home Rule, or any form in between.215 For
example, forty-one states, including Virginia, have passed bills that
preempt cities from being able to regulate ride sharing transportation
networks.216 Although preemption statutes are important in the Home
Rule context because they are the only way states can reclaim their control
from its localities, localities in Dillon Rule states are similarly harmed
from such statutes.217
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
This section argues that Virginia must limit its strict Dillon Rule
adherence for a variety of reasons, although the ultimate transition could
take countless forms. A number of viable options are discussed below.
A. Full Transition to Home Rule
The first and most drastic option for the Virginia General Assembly
to take is a full transition to Home Rule status. Though largely unlikely,218
considering the noteworthy benefits of this course of action is worthwhile.
First, it gives localities the power to enact progressive environmental
legislation that other localities and the General Assembly as a whole
may not support.219 These laws could include plastic straw bans or local
solar energy requirements.220
An unrestricted Home Rule status also allows localities to inde-
pendently address their own particular concerns, as opposed to only
allowing municipalities over a certain citizen-population to make their
own policymaking decisions.221 In addition, Home Rule accessibility across
the board will reduce the amount of time and resources local governments
must spend lobbying legislators to amend the Virginia code.222 It will also
increase the General Assembly’s efficiency by reducing the amount of
time it spends on distinctly local bills.223
215 Nicole DuPuis, City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State Analysis, NAT’L
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B. Mixed Rule State Options
1. Allow Home Rule for Specific Types of Localities
Presently, there are eight states that apply the Dillon Rule to only
certain municipalities.224 There is no established political leaning of states
who have chosen this category; some of these states include Tennessee,
Alabama, California, and Illinois.225 This type of government policymaking
structure gives designated localities the most flexibility while also retain-
ing the long-standing Dillon Rule precedent.226 In this structure, the
Virginia legislature could decide what types of localities warrant less
oversight, such as counties or cities over a certain population.227 This
benefits the state legislature by letting them focus their time on other
pressing issues instead of addressing constant calls from localities to
change the state code.228 In addition, state legislatures retain authority
over smaller local governments, which are the most susceptible to the
enactment of faulty or corrupt legislation.229
Providing cities or counties with Home Rule status frees them to
enact progressive environmental legislation that serves as experimental
for the state as a whole.230 Alternatively, even if the entire state does not
adopt a particular policy, cities largely contribute to the collective state’s
energy use, pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions.231 By allowing cities
and counties to address their environmental concerns, the state is pro-
moting environmental progress without enacting any policies itself.
2. Content-Based Dillon Rule Exceptions
Another option for state legislators is to add a code provision that
allows localities to pass legislation that directly improves the public
health or the natural environment. In other words, Virginia would create
a Dillon Rule exemption for those policies meeting the relevant criteria. The
Virginia Constitution itself advocates for environmental conservation
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and public health to the fullest extent, stating that “it shall be the policy of
the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources
[and] . . . protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, im-
pairment, or destruction, for the . . . general welfare of the people.”232 This
language allows the General Assembly to slightly break from judicial
precedent to more closely align with the intentions of the State’s Consti-
tution.233 In fact, Utah’s Supreme Court used similar general welfare
language in their Constitution to justify a full transition to Home Rule
status, claiming that this provision specifically granted localities the
power to ensure general welfare.234
In addition, this could be an enticing option for the General Assem-
bly if it wants to limit the applicability of this newly vested lawmaking
power. For example, if the Assembly wanted to give localities the power
to address uniquely environmental issues, but not to address social, eco-
nomic, or other types of issues that may be more contested throughout
the state, a specific environmental or public welfare exception may be the
best option.
3. Allowance for Home Rule Charters
Some states allow for localities to create their own charter if they
so desire to more effectively meet their citizens’ needs.235 This option is
complex. For example, the state of Washington gives their counties the
option of either creating a county board of commissioners that will be
subject to Dillon Rule requirements, or to adopt a Home Rule charter.236
Of Washington’s thirty-nine counties, only seven have opted to create Home
Rule charters.237 The adoption of a charter is a drastic measure because
“the powers, authority, and duties of county officers provided for by state
law . . . are vested in the county legislative authority, unless the charter
expressly assigns powers and duties to specific officers.”238 This option is
unpopular because along with the privileges of creating their own laws and
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policies, counties with Home Rule charters have the responsibility of “estab-
lish[ing] separate legislative and executive branches [and] ensur[ing]
responsibility and accountability for local and regional county gover-
nance and services.”239 This option is less drastic than a full Home Rule
transition, but more substantive than content-based Dillon Rule excep-
tions or a Mixed Rule alternative structure.
CONCLUSION
With a Democratic majority in both chambers of the General
Assembly,240 there is finally a clear path for much-needed state and local
government law reform in Virginia. A transition into any of the previ-
ously mentioned alternative structures will give Virginia’s localities the
flexibility necessary to meet the social, public health, economic, and en-
vironmental needs of their constituents. For example, allowing localities
to experiment with various environmental reforms will allow them to test
out various initiatives and offer the state legislature successful policies
to possibly implement on a state-wide level.241
In addition to these policy considerations, the General Assembly
must reconsider Dillon Rule adherence now that it fails to serve the pur-
poses purported by Judge Dillon.242 As noted above, the Dillon Rule no
longer ensures equality and fairness among the localities, and in many
ways, is promoting just the opposite.243 Moreover, the Dillon Rule is not
the only way that the state government can retain oversight authority
over localities.
As a whole, the Dillon Rule has long failed to serve a changing
society and climate. Allowing a locality the freedom to address an ever-
changing landscape of issues intimately affecting its own constituents
has proven successful in a variety of avenues across several states.244 It
is my hope that this Note highlights both the need and the feasibility of
Dillon Rule reform in Virginia as well.
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